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1. INTRODUCTION
The literature of  international relations, especially in the area of  foreign policy analysis (FPA), has not found it easy to accommodate the European Union (EU) 
fully in its study of  the international system, its processes 
and its evolution (Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 5). The scholars 
of  the field of  European study have different views in such 
regard. Rosamond (2000) suggests a number of  reasons, 
including “the international relation (IR) theorists ignored 
the development of  a Common European Foreign Policy or 
treated purely as empirical event” (p. 16).
Acharya points to the very foundation of  IR literature as 
the main reason for not incorporating the study of  regions 
and regionalism into the main realm of  international study. 
After criticizing the discipline of  IR for its inconsistency with 
reality of  current world politics, he, then, suggests a notion 
of  “Global IR” which establishes its very premise on the 
need of  IR as to be committed to pluralistic universalism, 
and integrating the study of  regions, and regionalism into 
the central concern of  IR. (Acharya, 2014. p. 647) Moreover, 
Europe was dealt with from a general integration point of  
view, rather than in terms of  Foreign policy. According to 
Wallace (1994), there are three possible reasons for that: 
First, the most mainstream theories of  international politics 
dealt with states and relations among them (EU is neither a 
state nor a traditional alliance). Second, IR theory has a bias 
toward the explanation of  broad phenomena; it trends toward 
generalization, while the EU is so far a unique example of  
international cooperation. Third, EU integration is more on 
domestic, trade, agriculture, money than on Common Foreign 
and Security policy. Finally, another more general reason is 
related to the scholarly identity of  leading intellectuals of  IR.
Friedrichs (2004) argues that “since its establishment as 
independent social science field of  study, IR has been 
The European Unions’ International Relations: A 
Theoretical View
Hayman Ahmed Hma Salah*
Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law and International Relations, University of Soran, Kurdistan Region – F.R. Iraq
*Corresponding author’s email: hemin.hawrami@parliament.krd
Received: 10 June 2019 Accepted: 20 June 2019 Available online: 29 June 2019
A B S T R A C T
This article explores major theoretical approaches to the study of European integration, European Union (EU) as a global 
power, and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The argument presented here is that only a combination of both 
International Relations and European integration approaches will allow us to understand the very premises of the European 
integration project in terms of both internal and external – international-aspects. This approach will be complementary 
to the attempts by researchers those who call to mainstream European studies and an appeal in favor of abounding 
the project of conceptualizing the EU as a single case or as being Sui generis. This article argues that, despite serious 
attempts by scholars of the field of European studies, it seems difficult to theorize European integration. The established 
literature to the existing political entities seems less relevant to study EU due to the union’s unique identity. Theories 
of EU integration are unable to explain or predict the process of integration, but they are normally outpaced by events.
Keywords: European Union, Foreign policy, Integration, International relations, Theoretical approaches
Access this article online
DOI: 10.25079/ukhjss.v3n1y2019.pp69-82 E-ISSN: 2520-7806
Copyright © 2019 Salah. Open Access journal with Creative 
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License 4.0 
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Salah: EU and International Relations Theory
UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Volume 3 • Number 1 • 201970 UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Volume 3 • Number 1 • 2019 71
classified as an American discipline of  the social science 
and that has come to be accepted by an increasing majority 
of  scholars all over the world” (pp. 1-2). Friedrichs, then, 
explains the consequences of  such scientific hegemony on 
the field itself  and the capability of  non-American scholars 
in expanding the horizon of  IR theories and in developing 
new approaches. Friedrichs argues that “such intellectual 
hegemony has become as structural bias in which American 
scholars have been seen as producers of  the IR field by 
putting themselves or by others into the center and the rest 
into the periphery. To that end, he suggests to the Western 
European communities of  IR scholars to overcome their 
status as dependent peripheries” (Friedrichs, 2004. pp. 1-2). 
Consequently, the study of  regionalism in IR seems to be 
less conspicuous, if  not excluded.
2. CLASSICAL EXPLANATIONS ON EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION
2.1. Federalism
Federalism proposes a normative account rather than 
analytical in the way that it is more concern with debate 
on why sovereign states should form a federation rather 
than providing an explanation of  why they might do so 
(Bergmann and Niemann, 2013. p. 3). For federalists, in 
general, the main problem in IR is the absence of  central 
authority, anarchy, because the independence of  multiple 
nation-states brings mistrust, reciprocal threats, rivalry, and 
violence (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 20). The 
main focus of  the federalist approach was security issue, 
so the ultimate premise of  federalism is that federation 
would bring a more stable interaction among various 
nation-states in a European continent. “They thought that 
decentralization of  sovereignty had been the root cause of  
conflict, in Europe, they were skeptical about conventional 
remedies for interstate anarchy, such as diplomacy and 
the balance of  power. Federalists had advocated the ideas 
of  the abolition of  national independence and the fusion 
of  different political entities into one” (Hill and Smith, 
2005. p. 20).
According to the federalist account, “the reasons for 
unification are ultimately political to tackle international 
anarchy, so, by relying on the classical distinction between 
‘high politics,’ which concerns life and death issues of  political 
order and violence and ‘low politics,’ which revolves around 
economic and social questions, federalism is situated firmly 
on the first side by stressing more on the political groups” 
(Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 21). Finally, it seems 
that the achievement of  a common foreign and defense policy 
is parallel with the main aim of  federalists.
2.2. Functionalism
The other classical approach to European integration derives 
from the functionalist school. Hill and Smith (2005) also 
found compare to federalist, functionalists believed that 
modern society was increasingly dominated by matters of  
“low politics,” including the welfare of  citizens and economic 
grows. According to them, “the fundamental motive for 
integration would not therefore concern the legal relationships 
between political communities but would stem from the 
inability of  nation-states to provide basic services to their 
citizens (Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 21). From such a perspective, 
the first school, federalism, seems to deal with groups, but 
the last one, functionalism, stresses the significance of  
individuals. Saurugger (2014) explains that “the central thesis 
of  functionalism is the belief  that the political game per se, i.e., 
politics, stands in the way of  the creation of  favorable social 
conditions for all. Ideological positions harbored by states are 
a powerful factor working against the collective wellbeing and 
which can also, in fine, lead to war” (p. 18).
2.3. Neofunctionalism
The neo-functionalism, which became a permanent 
approach of  integration study in the 1960s, utilized Mitrany’s 
functionalist framework of  analysis, and its emphasis on 
“low politics,” but agreed with federalism, in contrast with 
Mitrany’s account of  functionalism, on the desirability and 
feasibility of  a traditional union and a superstate, eventually 
with its own foreign and defense policy (Andreatta cited Hill 
and Smith, 2005. p. 21). However, the two schools, federalism 
and neofunctionalism are radically different in terms of  their 
identified mechanism behind unification. According to the 
neo-functionalism perspective, and Andreatta argues “there is, 
in fact, no conscious and explicit attempt to introduce a new 
federal constitution, in the words of  Ernst Hass, the funding 
architect of  neofunctionalism, “[a] new central authority may 
emerge as an unintended consequence of  incremental earlier 
steps”(Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 21). General 
distinction between functionalism and neofunctionalism 
was that, “while functionalism was profoundly anchored in 
normative thought, espousing conditions designed to bring 
about a more peaceful and fairer world, neofunctionalist 
approaches to integration are analytical, seeking to understand 
the reasons for, process leading to, and consequences of, 
regional integration” (Saurugger, 2014. p. 34). She explains 
that by proposing a study of  domestic factors to explain 
regional integration, neofunctionalism was clearly opposed 
to the dominant IR paradigm of  the time, neorealism, which 
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explained regional integration by looking at exogenous, i.e., 
the existence of  external enemy and the desire of  small states 
to join forces with larger ones to increase their influence 
(Saurugger, 2014. p. 34).
According to neofunctionalism, the key factor encouraging 
actors to create supranational political communities was not 
David Mitrany’s “technocratic automatism,” but rather the 
rational action of  a political and administrative elite seeking 
to defined its own interests (Saurugger, 2014. p. 36). Haas 
(1968) explains the main elements of  the neofunctionalist 
theory, as follows: 
The decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it rests 
on the perception of  interests and the articulation of  specific 
values on the part of  existing political actors. Rather than 
relying on a scheme of  integration which posits “altruistic” or 
“idealistic” motives as the conditioners of  conduct, it seems 
more reasonable assuming the pluralistic basis of  politics here 
used to focus on the interests and values defended by the 
major groups involved in the process, experience showing 
that these are far too complex to be described in such simple 
terms as “the desire for Franco-German peace” or the “will 
to a United Europe.” As the process of  integration proceeds, 
it is assumed that values will undergo change that interests 
will be redefined in terms of  a regional rather than a purely 
national orientation and that the erstwhile set of  separate 
national group values will gradually be superseded by a new 
and geographically larger set of  beliefs (pp. 13-14).
This quotation explains some the key ideas of  the 
neofunctionalist approach, including underlying the 
complexity of  variables leading to political decisions, and 
it also highlights the consequences of  integration process 
such as the change in values, beliefs, and ideas. Another 
key assumption, argues Rosamond (2000), was that 
“politics is group-based activity,” then he explains further, 
“neofunctionalism by emphasizing on actors and their 
interaction in terms of  process rather than outcomes, and as 
the process emerged from a complex web of  actors pursuing 
their interests within a pluralistic political environment” 
that neofunctionalism’s appearance coincided with the 
development of  pluralism in political science (p. 55).
The neofunctionalism approach is found on the two main 
assumptions, spill-over and transfer of  loyalty, respectively.
2.3.1. The first assumption, spill-over
In terms of  the notion of  spill-over, for all neofunctionalist 
concepts, it is the key-driven force behind all integration 
processes. Lindberg (1963) defines spill-over as “a situation 
in which the original action, related to a specific goal, creates 
a situation in which the original goal can be assured only 
by taking further actions, which, in turn, create a further 
condition and a need for more action and so forth” (p. 10). 
Rosamond (2000) provides an example model of  the spill-
over impact on EU integration, he explains that, “exchange-
rate coordination would then imply the need for wider 
cooperation in monetary policies, and this, in turn, would 
then lead to the establishment of  an economic and monetary 
union” (p. 60). According to neofunctionalists, there are two 
types of  spill-over, functional and political. The first kind 
refers to inter-connection of  various economic sectors or 
issue, and the integration in one area is spilling over into 
others. Political spill-over is the creation of  supranational 
governance models, such as the EU (Saurugger, 2014. p. 39).
The second assumption of  neofunctionalism, transfer of  
loyalty, is intertwined with political spill-over as in whatever 
form it took, it requires a process of  loyalty transference. 
The concept was central to Ernst Haas’s original definition 
of  political integration. Haas (1968) explains that “political 
integration is the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national sittings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activates toward a new center, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the 
pre-existing national states (p.16).
Then, Haas (1968) explains how such action is interconnected 
with the concept of  spill-over, he asserts that “the idea 
went that citizens would also transfer their allegiances to 
the new supranational institutions and, in doing so, further 
drive the integration process (Hass, 1968. p. 49). Despite such 
explanations, Saurugger (2014) criticizes Hass for his lack of  
model of  explanation of  such transformation in loyalty, he 
argues that “concentrating on governmental, political, and 
technocratic, the author did not provide a model to explain 
the transfer process  in fact, only the transfer of  loyalty by the 
national political elite, in favor of  a technocratic supranational 
body, was originally envisaged” (p. 43). The absence 
of  external factors in neofunctionalist explanation had 
challenged the expectation of  spill-over assumption. Haas 
admits such underestimation of  external factors; he explains 
that “understanding regional integration requires knowledge 
of  member states’ external relations with states other than 
those members of  the integration scheme.” Then, he clearly 
admits that there is a short sight in spill-over perception, he 
explains that “when changes in the international system are 
perceived both by the governmental elite and non-state actors, 
the limits of  automatic spill-over are reached” (Saurugger, 
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2014. p. 41). Finally, in neofunctionalist framework, due to 
its emphasis on “low politics” and its traditional distrust 
for power politics, foreign policy is neglected to an ancillary 
position (Andretta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 22).
2.4. Intergovernmentalism
The intergovernmental approach premised to be an 
alternative approach to neofunctionalism as its main 
contributors established the theories main assumptions as 
to be an answer to the critiques of  neofunctionalist. Stanley 
Hoffmann, the founding father of  intergovernmentalism, 
emphasizes the internal diversity of  states involved in the 
European integration process as opposed to Haas’s and 
Lindberg’s assumption of  convergence of  elites. He rejects 
the idea of  spill-over, as he argues that “integration is the 
result of  intergovernmental bargaining, which does not lead 
automatically to new policy areas being integrated” (Hoffman 
cited Saurugger, 2014. pp. 54-55). The intergovernmentalists 
are divided into two main groups, the contributors of  
conventional intergovernmentalism, and those who advocate 
liberalist perspectives, liberal intergovernmentalist, (LI).
Among the first group of  conventional intergovernmentalists, 
four conceptual contemporary intergovernmentalist 
approaches have emerged in EU studies.
2.4.1. Group 1
A first group analysis: The state in concentrating specifically on 
governmental elites and their actions. Stanley Hoffmann was 
the main contributor of  this particular intergovernmentalism 
school of  integration theory. According to Hoffmann, the 
real architectures behind integration are the main political 
actors, i.e., heads of  state and government, including the 
ministers of  foreign affairs, defense, economy, and finance. 
In his main criticism of  neofunctionalist, he reveals another 
key factor that needs to be taken into consideration in the 
integration process, which is the context that the state, 
the government, actually acts (Hoffman cited Saurugger, 
2014. p. 57).
In the conceptualization of  European integration, Hoffmann’s 
main assumption is included of  two central ideas which are 
also considered to be the central assumption of  the realist 
approach in IR.
The first assumption, the international system produces 
more diversity than coherence between its central unities, 
states. Since the situation of  each state is unique in the world, 
cooperation between states cannot lead to a homogenous 
system, rather to diversity, highlighted by intergovernmental 
bargaining in which individual leaders exert influence to 
various degrees (Hoffman cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 58). On 
the basis of  this hypothesis, Hoffmann believes that the 
possibility of  integration within the realm of  international 
affairs is subject to the issue of  government autonomy and 
state identity.
The second central assumption is that there is a difference 
between the economic domain and the political domain, 
and there is always a preponderance of  politics over the 
economy. Hoffman argues that “the self-propelling power of  
the unifying process is severely constrained by the associates’ 
view on ends and means. To go ‘beyond the nation-state,’ 
one must do more than set up procedures inadequate 
‘background’ and ‘process condition.’ A procedure is not 
a purpose, a process is not a policy” (Hoffmann, 1991. pp. 
83-84). In this hypothesis, Hoffmann tries to explain the 
logic behind integration, which he beliefs it is diversity, not 
spill-over as suggested by neofunctionalist. Finally, Hoffman’s 
approach, however, according to Rosamond, characterizes 
him more as a gifted commentator of  European affairs 
than an integration theorist attempting to compete with 
the complexity and richness of  neofunctionalist accounts 
(Rosamond, 2000. p. 50).
2.4.2. Group 2
The second group of  conventional intergovernmentalists, 
they assert that the evolution of  the EU has contributed to 
the preservation of  the nation-state as the main actor in the 
IR realm. That assumption roots its foundation in a historical 
account of  European integration by Milward, in the book 
“the European rescue of  the nation-state,” in 1992. Without 
European integration, the nation-state could not have offered 
its citizens the same level of  security and prosperity that it 
has done, in Western Europe at least.
After 1945, the European nation-state rescued itself  from 
collapse, created a new political conscience as the basis of  
its legitimacy, and through changes in its response to its 
citizens, which meant a sweeping extension of  its functions 
and ambitious reassured itself  as the fundamental unit of  
political organization … Interdependence is not, therefore, 
a phenomenon which has progressively and inexorably 
developed in 20th-century Eastern Europe. States, far from 
being its helpless prisoner, have actively sought to limit its 
consequences (Milward, 1992. pp. 3-8).
Saurugger (2014) argues that Milward has challenged the 
conventional views in regard to European integration as a 
process to provide an alternative to a nation-state in the form of  
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a EU. She explains that, according to Milward, “integration was, 
therefore, the conscious outcome of  European governments’ 
decision to pool sovereignty in certain areas. It is not human 
idealism which led to the European integration, but the self-
centered realism of  powerful governments” (pp. 60-61).
2.4.3. Group 3
The last group of  conventional intergovernmentalist, they 
refer to the influential approach of  the two-level game in 
the international negotiation theory. This approach is a 
combination of  number of  approaches including decision-
making and theories in IR. According to Saurugger (2014), 
“the two-level game is based on an assumption that the 
processes that occur within a state substantially influence 
the behavior of  the state at the international level. Thus, 
states are chief  negotiators at two tables. What happens at 
the international level, in turn, influence national polices” 
(p. 63). On the basis of  this hypothesis, the national and 
international polices are closely linked, and the two-level 
of  analysis, national and international, are intertwined and 
not independent. This conceptual framework has applied 
to a number of  case of  the EU institutions, the EC-USA 
agricultural negotiation as part of  the Kennedy Round 
(1964–67), for example. In the case of  assessing the success 
of  the approach, Saurugger argues that “approaches analyzing 
the interaction between the national and international levels 
in bilateral or multilateral negotiations have expanded the 
horizon of  intergovernmentalist account. However, such 
approaches are remaining far from providing a full account 
for the integration process (Saurugger, 2104. p. 66).”
LI emerged as contemporary intergovernmentalist account 
with an attempt to explain a puzzle of  the relaunch of  
European integration by the end of  the 1980s despite the 
ultimate change in the international system from being bipolar 
to unipolar as result of  the Soviet Union collapse, in 1992 
(Saurugger, 2014. p. 67). To that end, liberal governmentalism 
proposes two general factors, including intergovernmental 
bargaining and national interests. LI bases on the study of  
the behavior of  economically rational actors, hence it focuses 
on political and social interactions in economic integration. 
Through a serious of  publication from 1992 to 1995, Andrew 
Moravcsik, one of  the leading authorities in the approach, 
demonstrated two main assumptions for the LI approach. 
The first hypothesis is that “national preference represented 
at international level had obvious national origins.” Second 
central idea contracted on the assumption that “states wish to 
reduce transactions costs in an open economy, so European 
integration can be considered as collective action seeking to 
optimize gains for each state” (1992, 1995). In general, LI try 
to explain why sovereign states agree to pool their sovereignty 
into supranational institutions. For LI, European integration 
is the result of  a strategic calculation by member governments 
to promote their key economic interests, and of  a serious 
of  rational choices made by national elites (Saurugger, 2014. 
p. 68). In this respect, LI seems similar to Milward’s historical 
account of  European integration.
After analyzing a number of  key periods in European 
integration, Moravcsik provides a conclusion. In his remark, 
Moravcsik asserts that “European integration occurred for 
reasons of  economic interest, a possible economic boom and 
new markets with the huge possibility for exposition. He then 
argues that “other factors, geopolitics, ideology, and idealism, 
have undoubtedly influenced the integration, but only marginally 
and therefore deserve less attention” (Saurugger, 2014. p. 68). 
By focusing on economic interest, liberal intergovernmentalist 
intends to give empirical account to the very premise of  liberal 
intergovernmentalism, which proposes economic interest as 
the real motive for any regional integration. The second idea 
core idea of  LI is the notion of  international bargaining as 
three-stage process, and as the second pillar in the integration 
process. The stages are as follows:
1. The formation of  national preference driven by issues 
specific, mostly economic, interests.
2. Inter-state negotiations based on asymmetrical 
interdependence between member states.
3. The choice of  the supranational institution which 
reflects an interest in securing credible member state 
commitments. (Sauragger, 2014. p. 72).
Finally, liberal governmentalism had faced a number of  
critiques. The main one could be the possibility to consider 
economic reasons as the predominant force driving 
integration, argues Saurugger (2014) also argues, “whether 
it is appropriate to reject the ideological reasoning of  the 
Founding Fathers altogether” (p. 73).
3. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND IR THEORY
3.1. Realism
The integration theories have been criticized mainly on two 
counts. According to Filippo Andreatta, first, the integration 
theorists, their emphasis was too Eurocentric. The schools 
of  integration approaches were in fact, formulated in general 
terms, but they highlighted characteristics of  the process of  
European integration, which were not to be found in other 
region of  the world. Second, they employed a teleological 
approach, taking eventual full integration for granted, and 
Salah: EU and International Relations Theory
UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Volume 3 • Number 1 • 201974 UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Volume 3 • Number 1 • 2019 75
understanding both the potential resistance of  the nation-
state as well as the possibility of  forms of  integration which 
could stop short of  the creation of  a superstate (Andreatta 
cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 23). The continuation of  
the European security cooperation, the European Political 
Cooperation exactly, in the post-cold War era, as well as 
European integration in general, posed a puzzle for realist 
theory. Krotz and Mahar (2011) explain that, “with collapse 
of  the USSR and the Warsaw pact, European states no longer 
faced a threat to their political and territorial integrality, 
accordingly, many realists expected European integration 
would be weakened or recede in these areas, and some 
even anticipated power competition to return to European 
continent” (p. 557). Such a pessimistic view for the possibility 
of  international cooperation has rooted in the realist main 
assumptions in regard to the nature of  international system.
Realism was dominant paradigm in the study of  IR, and it was 
based on the three main assumptions, including the state is the 
dominant actor and acts as a coherent, unitary, and rational 
unit in the international system, IR is in a state of  anarchy, 
and in the absence of  higher authority politics is determined 
by military consideration and war is therefore always a 
possibility (Krotz and Mahar, 2011. p. 557). In general, 
realists are conscious about the possibility of  international 
cooperation, which is other than for security reasons. For 
example, Mearsheimer (1994. p. 5) argues that “the most basic 
motives driving states is survival and states want to maintain 
their sovereignty” (p. 10). In their explanation of  European 
integration, realists are proposing security reason and balance 
of  power as main motivations by European member states 
to continue cooperation in the aftermath of  the Cold War.
Jones attributes the increase in intra-European security 
cooperation to changes in the structure of  both the 
international system and the regional system in Europe 
following the end of  the Cold War. Two subsequent 
developments changed the security environment in Europe 
and potentially threatened its stability.
He explains that “first, a unified Germany emerged as a 
potential regional hegemony. Then, in the early 1990s, the 
United States began to rapidly reduce its troop’s presence 
on the continent, raising concerns about its long-term 
commitment to European security” (Jones, 2007. p. 22). 
On containing Germany, Joseph Grieco, elaborating on an 
earlier insight by Morgenthau (1973) suggests that European 
integration may be the result of  the attempts of  other member 
states to constrain Germany, especially after it has emerged 
potentially stronger after unification (p. 509). According 
to Grieco (1995), “if  states share common interests and 
undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative 
arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners 
will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide 
sufficient opportunities for them to voice their concerns 
and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate 
their domination by stronger partners” (p. 34). The second 
reason, according to Jones was to increase Europe’s ability 
to project power abroad and to decrease its reliance on the 
USA. Jones (2007) explains that “European leaders believed 
that aggregating power was necessary to decrease reliance on 
the United States and increase their ability to project power 
abroad. Power and autonomy are important because they 
make European states more secure and increase their ability, 
as already stated, to influence, deter, and coerce others. This 
has been particularly true since American and European 
security interests steadily began to diverge with the collapse 
of  the Soviet Union” (p. 22).
However, realists have a different view in regard to the 
motivation to balance the US hegemony, and they hold 
perspectives on whether this balancing is of  the “hard” 
or “soft” power type, for example, Brooks and Wohlforth 
(2008) see no evidence of  such balancing. They argue that 
“the real motivation behind the increase in intra-European 
security and defense cooperation is more related to regional 
security concern rather than balancing American ambitions” 
(pp. 80-83). Lieber and Alexander (2005) take the same but a 
bit radical view on such balancing, they argue that “European 
security and defense cooperation are not in such scale to be 
counted to balance U.S. preponderance” (p. 111). Art (2011) 
takes issue with both of  these views. First, he argues that 
“the motive behind the EU’s effort to increase its security 
and defense capabilities is clearly a case of  balancing the 
United States” (Art cited Krotz and Mahar, 2011. p. 562). 
Then, he argues explains that “specifically, Britain and France 
launched ESDP to enhance their political influence within 
the transatlantic alliance through soft balancing, but not to 
challenge America’s military hegemony with hard balancing” 
(Art cited Krotz and Mahar, 2011. p. 562). In the case of  
cooperation on common foreign policy that issue could be 
conceptualized as a strong and permanent form of  alliance 
(Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 27). Paul Schroeder 
has suggested that “alliances are formed for two main 
purposes, including capability aggregation and the control of  
allies” (Schroeder cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 27).
Snyder explains how these two missions is undertaken, 
“in order to gain on these two fronts, states are willing to 
limit their own autonomy and follow the presentations of  
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alliances and other international agreements” (Snyder, 1997). 
Andreatta argues that “integration could represent a more 
dramatic loss of  autonomy justified by an equally dramatic 
increase in common capabilities and in the capacity for mutual 
control” (Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 27).
Despite its attempt to explain European integration, according 
to Wayman and Diehl (1994), “realism is not well designed to 
explain the political integration of  Western Europe” (p. 17). 
Andreatta argues that “the success of  European integration 
and the beginning of  European foreign policy have somehow 
forced realists to give an explanation to these phenomena, 
even at the cost of  adapting their main theories” (Andreatta 
cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 25). According to Grieco, “the 
Europe well for integration creates a problem for realist 
theory” (Grieco cited Hill and Smith, 2005. p. 25). Kenneth 
Waltz, the founder of  neorealism, has proposed a solution to 
the question of  European integration within the framework 
of  contemporary realism. First of  all, Waltz (1979) argues that, 
in general, integration is an exceptional event. Although the 
integration of  the nation is often talked about, it seldom takes 
place. Nations could mutually enrich themselves by further 
dividing not only the labor that goes into the production of  
goods, but also some of  the other tasks they perform, such 
as political management and military defense (p. 105).
Then, he proposes a reason for integration; he explains that 
“there are exceptions to this rule, as there is the fact that some 
states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly 
than survival” (Waltz, 1979. p. 92). However, Waltz proposes 
that such an exceptional event would not change the basic 
foundation of  the international system. Waltz (1986) argues 
that “even if  it eventually took place, integration could only 
alter the distribution of  power among different units (for 
example, the United States of  Europe would become a world 
superpower), but it could not alter basic characteristics of  
the international system, as the fusion of  several states into 
one does not alter the anarchic relationship between new unit 
and all other ones which have not participated in the union” 
(p. 226). Waltz (1986), another neorealist, argues that “there 
is no possibility for the creation of  a world, or even regional, 
government: What emerges are alliances that states enter 
into out of  self-interest. Only under certain circumstance 
(in this point, he supports Waltz idea of  seeing integration 
as an exceptional event) does regional cooperation become 
possible” (Walt cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 61).
3.2. Liberalism
The liberal paradigm is more easily adapted to explain 
European integration and the emergence of  a European 
common foreign policy for two reasons. According to Filippo 
Andreatta, on the one hand, liberals adopt a more flexible 
approach than realists on the question of  the actors in 
international politics, allowing also for a role of  supranational 
organizations. On the other hand, liberals are generally more 
optimistic on the prospects of  interstate cooperation and are 
therefore more willing to acknowledge the successes of  the 
European community and the EU (Andreatta cited Hill and 
Smith, 2005. p. 28).
These reasons are reflecting the core assumptions of  
liberalism in the field of  international studies. There are four 
main liberalist approaches which can be applied to study the 
European integration and the emergence of  common foreign 
policy, including republican, commercial liberalism, liberal 
community, and institutionalism.
The republican liberalist approach is based on the 
assumption that domestic regimes have a significant role 
in the formulation of  foreign policy. “Democracies (or 
Republics, in Kantian language) behavior differently from 
non-democratizes in the international scene, because they 
are forced to take the electorate’s view into account, because 
they are governed by complex instructional mechanism, 
and because they are based on norms prescribing peaceful 
conflict resolution”(Andreatta cited Hill and Smith, 2005. 
p. 28). From such perspectives, European integration could 
be understood as a result of  the democratization in the 
aftermath of  the Second World War, in the Western part of  
Europe, specifically. The emphasis on the domestic structure 
has also been theorized by intergovernmentalist.
The second liberalist approach is based on the commercial 
tradition and profound impact of  economic processes. 
According to the main hypotheses of  this school, the resent 
growth in transnational flows has created interdepended 
modern societies which have altered the traditional 
conception of  national interests (Keohane and Nye, 1977).
Andreatta explains the interdepend hypothesis, “in particular, 
security matters have lost their preponderance to economic 
considerations and the latter force governments to an 
unprecedented level of  cooperation. Then, the difficulty 
in controlling transnational interdependence with scale 
of  the nation-state has been even created an incentive to 
pool political resources together by building institutions 
with sufficient critical mass to deal with the new issues” 
(that is inconsistency with idea of  spill-over, in general, 
by neofunctionalist) (Andreatta cited in Hill and Smith, 
2005. p. 30).
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The third liberal approach is based on the assumptions 
by Franc Schimmelfennig, which he proposed them in his 
refuting accounts to the LI. Schimmelfennig explains his 
purpose in proposing such account, “I therefore propose to 
move beyond the limitations of  commercial LI. I formulate 
building blocks and hypotheses of  a theory of  liberal 
community that applies a different variant of  liberalism 
to European integration: Ideational liberalism. A liberal 
international community is a community of  liberal states 
governed by liberal norms such as peace, multilateralism, 
and democracy, and based on a post-national, civic identity. 
Ideational liberalism argues that liberal norms shape 
the constitutional developments of  liberal community 
organizations and override economic interests and material 
bargaining power” (Schimmelfennig cited Friedman et al., 
2013. p. 553).
According to ideational liberalism’s perspectives, international 
and regional organizations, such as the EU, are not simply 
functional institutions for managing interdependence 
and stabilizing cooperation. They represent international 
communities with distinct identities, values, and norms. 
For a liberal theory of  regional integration, it matters most 
whether such identities, values, and norms are liberal or not. 
The international dissemination and institutionalization of  
liberal ideas strengthen liberal community, and the strength 
of  liberal community strengthens liberal regional integration 
(Schimmelfennig cited Friedman et al., 2013, pp.259-260).
According to Schimmelfennig (2003), “liberal international 
communities are defined by two core characteristics. They 
are made up of  liberal states, and they establish a liberal 
order among these liberal states. In other words, a liberal 
international community is both a community of  liberal states 
and a liberal community of  states” (p. 260). He then explains 
what are the different features of  the liberal community 
approach, which makes it more academically comprehensive 
in the case of  explaining European integration. First, the main 
distinction between LI based on commercial liberalism and 
theory of  liberal community based on ideational liberalism is 
ontological, whereas LI is based on a materialist, economic 
ontology, the theory of  liberal community starts from an 
intersubjective or idealist ontology according to which social 
ideas such as values, norms, and identities matter for social 
processes and outcomes. On the other hand, the theory of  
the liberal community does not necessarily reject the focus 
of  LI on state or governmental actors, or its assumption 
of  (bounded) rationality and domestic political constraints. 
Governments may well be both relevant and rational actors, 
but they act on the basis of  ideational preferences and/or in 
a community environment, in which identities, values, and 
norms empower or constrain their actions (Schimmelfennig, 
2013. p. 262).
Schimmelfennig’s liberal community approach is limited to 
only those hypnoses that are relevant for the puzzles of  LI. 
First hypotheses, according to Schimmelfennig (2001), “non-
liberal states are excluded from membership in the EU. In cases 
of  conflict between material (economic) interests and liberal 
community norms, the norm of  liberal membership overrides 
the economic interests and the superior bargaining power 
of  the member. The second assumption, “if  the transfer of  
competencies from the state to the EU undermines national 
liberal and democratic institutions, these institutions (or the 
functions they perform) are recreated at the supranational 
level. Whereas commercial liberalism is only concerned 
with the efficiency of  supranational institutions, ideational 
liberalism claims that they must also be legitimate from a 
liberal-democratic point of  view. This also holds if  legitimacy 
reduces efficiency” (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig, 2006. 
p. 1147). On the bases of  these hypotheses, the theory of  
the liberal community argues that ideational factors trump 
economic interests or material bargaining power when 
community identities, values, and norms are at stake. There is 
no assumption that such ideational factors produce invariably 
more integration than economic factors. At times, liberal 
norms may bring about a larger or more deeply integrated 
EU than economic interests or bargaining power. On the 
other hand, however, identities and norms may also prevent 
steps toward integration that appears functionally efficient. In 
the case of  European common foreign policy that liberalist 
account may explain why consciences in the area of  foreign 
affairs are not functionally efficient when each member 
state has its own understanding for the subjective outcome 
of  the policy.
3.3. Constructivism
Constructivist approaches came into the field of  the 
European integration studies at the end of  the 1990s. Initially 
developed in the discipline of  sociology, anthropology, and 
constructivist approaches defend the idea that “reality is 
socially constructed and that the sociology of  knowledge 
must analyze the processes within which this occurs” 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966 cited Sauragger, 2014. p. 145). 
In general, constructivists are focusing on the impact of  
ideational factors (world-view, collective understanding, ideas, 
norms, values, etc.). On the political action, and how these 
variables involve in shipping political outcomes? Saurugger 
(2014) explains the main assumption of  constructivism 
that “constructivism, as its properly known, is found on 
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the idea that social reality is constructed and reproduced 
through permanent interaction between social agents. For 
constructivists, the material world does not present itself  as 
a classified entity, and they insist on the claim that the objects 
of  our knowledge, therefore, do not exist independently 
of  our interpretation and language” (p. 146). She, then, 
summarizes the key ideas of  social constructivism in three 
claims:
1. Contextualization: Individuals not only act according to 
a rational cost-benefit analysis but also are embedded in 
social structure, thus act as “social agents.”
2. Coconstitution of  agents and structures: Actors and 
structures are mutually constitutive: Actors shape 
structures, which, in turn, shape actors.
3. Interests are endogenously constructed: The preference 
of  agents is constituted by structures which not only act 
as constraints but also shape the way in which actors 
consider what their interests are (Saurugger, 2014. 
p. 148).
According to constructivism, the agent is acting according 
to certain principles which later can be count as the logic 
of  a constitutive plyer. Saurugger (2014) also explains 
“the logic of  appropriateness; actors are more influenced 
by social norms in their actions and behavior than by any 
weighing up of  the costs and benefits of  a particular course 
of  action. It is more a question of  behaving ‘correctly,’ 
according to criteria established by a society or a group, than 
of  maximizing one’s preference – an attitude known as the 
logic of  consequentialism” (p. 147).
In terms of  the logic of  arguing, Risse (2000) suggests that, 
“considering the processes of  argumentation, deliberation, 
and persuasion as a distinct mode of  social interaction, 
instead of  opposing material interests and ideal variables 
(world-views) being central factors influencing actor behavior 
and, subsequently, political outcomes. This logic occupies the 
middle ground between strategic bargaining and rule-guided 
behavior. It starts from the assumption that human actors 
engage in truth-seeking with the aim of  reaching mutual 
understanding. This, however, is only possible if  actors are 
prepared to change their world-view, values, and interests” 
(p. 1). In the area of  foreign policy, the EU could enhance 
such policy area by defining what would be the EU’s criteria 
for the union’s common foreign policy.
Constructivists have analyzed IR as historically and socially 
contingent phenomena. A constructivist, Wendt (1999) 
argues that “the structures of  human association are 
determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material 
forces and that the identities and interests of  purposive 
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given 
by nature” (p. 1). Constructivist in IR can be divided into 
three-movement groups, including modernist/neoclassical, 
conventional, interpretive, and radical/critical constructivists. 
Although epistemologically very different, these three 
movements take a particular interest in two objects, norms 
and interests. These two concepts are also crucial factors in 
the context of  constructivism in European studies.
According to constructivism, norms coconstitute actor 
behavior and they make specific behavior possible. To prevail 
and contained, norms should be internalized by those within 
a community. Norms are an outcome of  social interaction 
between actors from different communities. For that reason, 
it is difficult to analyze social norms exogenously, or to 
spate, them from the social context in which they emerge, 
transform, or disappear. Saurugger (2014) argues “norms can 
be divided into groups, regulatory norms, which determine 
what states should and should not do, and constitutive ones, 
which create roles, identities, and interests for states” (p. 150). 
An example of  the role of  norms within the establishments 
of  EU, the method of  decision-making in the European 
Council of  Ministers is through consensus itself  a norm 
constructed by social interaction at the same time the use 
of  this method influences the attitude of  member-states 
representatives in EU negotiations (Saurugger, 2014. p. 151). 
In terms of  the concept of  interests, constructivist idea is 
to redefine the notion of  state interest and question several 
tenets of  rational IR theories, which they see as being neither 
the same of  individual interests of  national actors or national 
interest groups as a whole, nor the interests of  an elite 
“disconnected from people,” as founded in the LI. Moreover, 
constructivists reject the simple juxtaposition of  interests 
and institutions. In their view, intersubjective arrangements 
constitute but also constrain interests.
In their attempt to analyze European integration, 
constructivist has developed three concepts which each has 
focused on a number of  aspects that considered to be leading 
motive of  European integration, including socialization and 
learning, collative identity formation, and actor-centered 
power constriction. Risse (2000) explains “Socialization 
and learning are perspectives of  constructivist which see 
European integration as socialization and learning process. 
It causes norms to be internalized and defined through 
interaction” (p.b). Schimmelfennig explains (2000) more 
specifically that “member states” perceptions of  their political 
interests evolve due to an international socialization process” 
(p.b). For constructivist, the starting point for analyzing 
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European integration, argues Wiener (2006 and 2008), 
was “a link between the social construction of  institutions 
and the success in implementing rules, norms and legal 
principles”(p. 54). Saurugger asks about the time frame of  
the socialization process, “when precisely do socialization 
processes occur?” Socialization occurs when norms, world-
view, and collective understanding are internalized, and then 
subsequently codified by a group of  actors (Schimmelfennig 
and Risse cited Saurugger, 2014. p. 153).
In the case of  learning and European integration, the 
conceptualization of  learning has two advantage of  
undersetting the subject. First of  all, it shows that certain 
actors succeed in imposing their interpretation of  social 
phenomena on others not only because they have the 
necessary authority. Their arguments are percussive because 
they have managed to create a common understanding of  a 
problem and, as such, they hold a legitimate position through 
the broader social context in which they are embedded 
(Jobert and Muller 1987; Dimitove and Rhinhard 2005 cited 
Saurugger, 2014. p. 154). The second advantage is about 
the levels where reality is constituted. Reality is constructed 
by the individual, the groups which it belongs, the media 
or, more generally, by the messages transmitted on several 
levels: Locally, regionally, nationally, Europe wide or more 
internationally (Saurugger, 2014. p. 155).
The second perspective of  constructivists in European studies, 
it is the issue of  the social construction of  a European identity 
which has emerged as a response to the question of  how a 
common European identity had been constructed. In this 
respect, the common assumption among constructivists is that 
European integration leads to the emergence of  a transnational 
identity. In the two approaches presented above, there is a 
lack of  clear respect to the impact of  power relations and 
strategic behavior of  policy agents. The third perspective by 
constructivists, actor-centered constructivism, had developed 
to accommodate these limits in the two previous accounts. The 
main assumption of  this approach is that Saurugger (2014) 
explains “actor behavior is influenced by beliefs and ideas 
framed by specific power constellations” (p. 152).
Finally, in terms of  constructivist view on European common 
and defense policy, Krotz and Mahar (2011) summarized 
the constructivist scholars’ estimation to the possibility of  
the institutionalization of  the common foreign and defense 
policy.
A number of  scholars (and not only those studying 
strategic culture) and policy practitioners have claimed that 
European foreign policy, security, and defense, (if  they are 
to grow beyond current roles and capabilities), will require a 
foundation of  shared interests, values, priorities, perceptions 
of  threat legitimate means and ends for the use of  military 
force, as well as agreement on Europe’s proper role in the 
world. If  disagreement or divergence on these issues persists, 
many academics and policymakers believe, then cooperation 
in these policy areas is unlikely to develop and consolidate 
(p. 256).
4. DECISION-MAKING AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION
The emergence of  decision-making as an approach to 
the study of  international politics was an outcome of  
attempts by scholars of  “behaviorist” school of  IR. They 
were essentially unsatisfied with leading approaches of  the 
study of  international political phenomena, including the 
emphasis on national power and national interests. Among 
the leading founders of  the decision-making approach, 
Snyder (1916–1997) argued that “studying these phenomena 
were not helpful in explaining the why of  governmental 
behaviors. Then, he proposed that “we define state action as 
the behavior of  its official decision-makers, thus providing 
a clear empirical focus for studying the behavior of  nation-
state, as well as, other political entities” (Snyder cited Sapin, 
2002. pp. 7-8). Snyder et al. (2002), (in their writing “foreign 
policy decision-making,” which became a funding work for 
the decision-making approach) contributed to IR theory to 
identify the point of  theoretical interaction between the most 
important determination of  state behavior, material, and 
ideational factors. Snyder (2002) explains they argued “the 
point of  interaction is not the state and that is where classical 
and even contemporary IR theory is lacking and needs 
augmentation, but the point is the human decision-maker” 
(pp. 3-4). Decision-making approach has founded on the 
premise that it will be a distinct approach to IR, an approach 
does not describe and measure interactions, but rather study 
the formulation and execution of  policy. Hudson explains 
why decision-making approach is needed in the IR theory. 
Hudson also argues that “if  one wishes to probe the ‘why’ 
questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction 
patterns which rest on state action, then decision-making 
analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as to say 
that the ‘why’ questions cannot be answered without analysis 
of  decision-making” (p. 7).
The decision-making approach is founded on a number 
of  assumptions and principles. Assumption one that a 
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fundamental need in the field of  international politics at this 
time is more effective and more explicit conceptualization 
(Snyder et al., 2002. p. 26). Snyder et al. (2002) try to justify their 
claim of  the need for an explicit theory in IR study. They argue 
that “all attempts to describe and explain human behavior 
require that what has already transpired be recaptured not 
in all its original detail, but selectively according to a scheme 
employed by the reporter or observer. Assumption two that 
any interpretative scheme must meet certain tests including 
operational, predictive, and efficiency. On the basis of  these 
hypotheses, decision-making approach can be counted as a 
valid and justified theory of  IR. The third assumption that 
the basis for a general theory of  interpretational politics does 
not exist at this time. Here, they try to prove the validity of  
inclusive frameworks, in general, including decision-making, 
as more possible attempt to conceptualize IR in compare with 
any impossible effort for establishing a general theory for IR. 
Beside assumptions, decision-making approach has the main 
characteristic which is one fruitful method of  altering the 
observer to the major determinants of  state behavior. From 
such a perspective, politicians in the form of  decision-makers 
are the real master of  the state’s action. Such emphasis on the 
impact of  policymakers can be understood as an attempt to 
take into account sociological variables in state behavior, and 
it can also be analyzed as a refutation against the objective 
reality assumption of  contemporary approaches by decision-
making theorists. Most of  the contemporary approaches of  
IR hold the idea that objective reality in effect determines or 
prescribes the behavior of  the state. That according to the 
advocators of  decision-making approach, the contemporary 
theories of  International Relations propose a deterministic 
type of  explanation to the state behavior (pp.27-49). 
Mainstream IR theories prescribe international politics as 
ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the 
will of  individual decision-makers.
The first advocators of  decision-making approach have a 
definition for international politics with proposing great 
respect to the role of  political entities above all national 
states. They explain that “we believe that those who study 
international politics are mainly concerned with the action, 
reaction, and interaction among political entities called 
national states” (Snyder et al., 2002. p. 55). Snyder et al. (2002) 
continue on their attention to the statutes on nation-states 
in the IR field, “we are also assuming that the nation-state 
is going to be the significant unite of  political action for 
many years to come. Strategies of  action and commitment 
of  resources will continue to be decided at the national 
level” (p. 58). That does not mean, the decision-making 
approach neglects the role and existence of  international 
organizations and supranational entities. They explain their 
position in regard of  non-nation-states unites. It does not 
blind us to the development or existence of  supranational 
forces and organizations. The basic question is solely how 
the latter are to be treated. We prefer to view the United 
Nations as a special mode of  interaction in which the 
identity and policymaking capacity of  individual national 
states are preserved but subjected to different conditioning 
factors. The collective actions of  the United Nations can 
hardly be explained without reference to the action of  the 
various capitals (Snyder et al., 2002. p. 58). It may be true 
to the development and existence of  the EU. The main 
contribution of  the decision-making approach to the IR 
study is the theory’s perception of  the status of  the state, and 
more precisely, how state should be represented and how its 
role should be analyzed. “State action is the action taken by 
those acting in the name of  the state. Hence, the state is its 
decision-makers” (Snyder et al., 2002. p. 79). On the basis of  
this hypothesis, the state is not an absolute abstraction unite, 
but decision-makers can be count as the personification of  
such imaginary entity. To explain how decision-makers reach 
to the final stage of  a decision, the decision-making approach 
explains how actors are oriented to action, and it considers 
agents as a participant of  a system of  action. Snyder et al. 
(2002) explain that “the definitions of  the situation which we 
consider to be central to the explanation of  state behavior 
results from the decision-making process in an organizational 
context” (p. 76). In the same respect, Allison and Zelikow 
(1999), the essence of  decision, explain the impact of  the 
organization in shaping the behavior of  decision-makers.
For some purposes, government behavior can usefully be 
summarized as action chosen by a unitary, rational decision-
maker: Centrally controlled, completely informed, and value 
maximizing. However, a government is not an individual … 
It is a vast conglomerate of  loosely allied organizations, 
each with a substantial life of  its own. Governments define 
alternatives and estimate consequences as their component 
organization process information; governments act as these 
organizations enact retunes … Thus, government behavior 
relevant to any important problem reflects the independent 
output of  several organizations, partially coordinated by 
government leaders (Allison and Zelikow, 1999. p. 143).
Snyder et al. (2002) are explaining the position of  the 
organizational unit on the capability of  decision-makers. The 
argue that “the unite is an observer’s analytical device to allow 
identification and isolation of  those actions and activities 
which are a concern to him” (p. 82). In the case of  foreign 
policy, it can be arguing that there is an organizational unite 
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which is constituted to be able to select a course of  action to 
achieve setting objectives, and it also subjects foreign policy 
decision-makers to its setting restricted options. Foreign 
policy as to particular form of  decision-making, it can be 
explained from a decision-making approach’s perspective.
Foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) refers to the choices 
individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a nation’s 
actions on the international stage (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. 
p. 3). According to Mintz and DeRouen (2010), there are four 
determinants of  foreign policy decisions, which each has 
its own impact on the decision-making the process. There 
is consisting of  the decision environment, psychological 
factors (in the case of  politicians), international factors, and 
domestic factors (ibid.4). Furthermore, FPDM consists of  
four components: 
1. Identifying the decision problem,
2. Searching for alternatives,
3. Choosing an alternative, and 
4. Executing the alternative. (Robinson and Snyder, 1965. 
p. 437 cited Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. p. 4).
Mintz and DeRouen (2010) explain the reasons for studying 
FPDM and the approach’s main contribution to the study 
of  IR.
There is a great need to reference to the decision making 
of  individuals to understand any crisis and war. In the case 
of  FPDM, the analysis from such perspective can uncover 
cognitive processes that lead to foreign policy making and 
“get into the minds” of  leaders who make the decisions. 
It can also help identify unique and general patterns of  
decisions and generate insights about leadership styles and 
personalities that cannot be revealed through a systematic 
approach to FPA (p. 6)
To a great extent, the decision-making approach to foreign 
policy has been founded on the basis of  the assumption of  
the unitary, rational actor, which it, since its emergence has 
highlighting the psychology of  FPDM of  groups, collations, 
and of  course, and leaders (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. p. 6).
Such a hypothesis of  the rational actor is parallel with a 
realist approach to the statues of  state in the context of  IR. 
According to the realist paradigm, it assumes that states, as 
a unitary actor, act to maximize gains and minimize losses 
while navigating an anarchical international system (Waltz 
1979; Mearsheimer, 1995 cited Mintz and DeRouen, 2010. 
p. 7). The assumption became a model, and a linchpin of  
FPDM, the rational actor model of  FPDM. The core of  the 
hypotheses is that its decision-making is a process which its 
participants are rational. Allison and Zelikow (1999) defines 
rationality as a “consistent, value-maximizing choice within 
specified constraints” then he argues that “the rational 
decision maker chooses the alternative that provides the 
consequence that is most preferred” (pp. 29-30).
To explain how a decision is formulated, the FPDM approach 
is dividing decisions over a number of  types on the bases of  
the level of  dependency of  a particular decision to the overall 
of  a decision-makers record of  decisions. Types are including, 
one-shot or single decision, strategic and interactive decision, 
sequential decision, and group decision. Another group type 
of  decisions is divided based on the number of  participants, 
consisting of  unilateral, and negotiated. The last group is 
divided on the base of  the number of  options, including 
structural, semi-structured, and unstructured decisions. In 
the case of  EU, Herman (2001) argues, “the union’s decision 
type can be understood as a decision which formulated as 
a result of  the interaction among member states. Besides 
the division of  decision into a number of  groups, there are 
levels of  analysis in FPDM. The levels are individual group 
and coalition” (p. 30).
Again in the case of  the EU common foreign policy, the 
individual level can help to explain an individual member 
states’ foreign policy at the nation-state level. At the group 
level, it can be used to analyze how foreign ministers of  EU 
member states come to an agreement. Finally, at the coalition 
level, it may provide an explanation of  how the EU and 
another political player treat each of  in the area of  foreign 
policy, for example, the EU and the United States.
5. CONCLUSION
The development of  the EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy is challenging of  what has traditionally been defined as 
a regional actor or treated as an empirical event. The literature 
of  International Relations still does not fully accommodate 
the EU because the very premises of  IR commit to not 
include regionalism into its portfolio. The evolution of  the 
EU from an economic block to a political union with having 
a common foreign policy in place ponders students of  IR 
about the need for a pluralistic approach to international 
studies. Such approach of  International Relations should 
include regionalism, and loosen scientific hegemony.
Major theories of  integration studies seem less promising 
to provide an insightful account to the growing scale of  
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the European project. However, these theories are helpful 
in telling the reasons for integration in the first place. 
Federalism suggests any political or economic platform as 
a means to bring trust among various nation-states in such 
anarchy nature of  the international system. It pays credit to 
security factor as a mean motive for any integration projects. 
Functionalism proposes integration project as a mechanism 
by sovereign states to enhance their position to meet the 
growing demand of  the population. Functionalism does 
not concern much with the question of  foreign affairs as 
the state’s higher politics, but it focuses more on domestic 
issues. On the other side, neofunctionalists count foreign 
policy as a means to prove one entity’s chance to increase 
its influence by joining a political union project. For them, 
integration spills over from one aspect to another, from 
economic to political, for example. Such level of  integration 
is an outcome of  much serious commitment, transfer of  
loyalty, which means political actors are looking for a new 
center beyond national ones.
The idea of  spill-over as main factor behind further 
integration has been challenged by intergovernmentalism. 
Unlike neofunctionalists, this group believes that what causes 
integration is bargaining among government officials. A 
group of  intergovernmentalists is going as far as they count 
integration, EU, as a shield which provides protection to the 
individual sovereign states of  Europe. That is to argue that 
the realist approach by powerful governments is the real 
cause, not human idealism, which makes EU thrive. Another 
group of  intergovernmentalists, liberalist, have found their 
entire argument on the bases of  calculation for economic 
interests as principal factor for further integration.
The integration theories are criticized for being too 
Eurocentric and neglect the potential resistance of  nation-state 
to the creation of  a superstate. The continued development 
of  the European project, in the post-cold War, posed a 
puzzle to realist thinkers. Classical realists counted the threat 
of  the Soviet Union as the principal motive for Europeans 
to pursue such an integration project. As Soviet Russia had 
collapsed, the neorealist pointed to the nature of  international 
structure as main factor that would lead Europeans to remain 
within the Union. On the other hand, liberalism accepted all 
possible rational which led to the emergence of  the Union, 
and later, a European common foreign policy. Liberalism 
is always value interstate cooperation and adopts a more 
flexible approach to the international system. According to 
liberalist, the EU is an outcome of  democratization which 
is backed by the domestic structure of  member states. They 
recognize the project as bound of  interdependence among 
member states to overcome narrow conceptions of  national 
interests. Moreover, for some liberalists, the Union represents 
a community of  liberal states those who believe in liberal 
principles. For constructivists, the EU is a social project 
which member states are working together according to the 
logic of  appropriateness. The project is underway to grow 
because member states are learning to from each other, and 
they are a question each other’s behavior.
Decision-making is another theoretical approach which 
can unveil different aspects of  the EU project. The theory 
suggests different epistemology to IR. It does not describe 
and measure interaction, but rather study the formulation and 
execution of  a policy. The whole primes of  IR theories are 
to answer what questions. Decision-making approach tells 
the answer to why question through underlying the events, 
conditions, and interactions which rest on the state’s action. 
The approach concerns mainly with a cognitive process that 
leads someone to make a distinct decision. To understand 
why a decision is made with such a feature, we need to have 
clear background of  the actor, and deep knowledge of  the 
institutional structure. It may not be helpful in our case to 
provide a clear path to the development of  a European 
common foreign policy as we are looking for norms not 
the behavior of  an actor and performance of  an institution 
in a certain period of  time. Finally, any attempt to theorize 
the European project may face several serious challenges. 
The existing theoretical frameworks on different entities are 
founded difficult if  not impossible, to apply on the EU case 
that is due to the uniqueness of  the body.
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